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Abstract.  The purpose of the paper is to question the decline in the Portuguese voter turnout rate 
and apparent lack of interest in politics. We argue that the decline could lie with methodologically artificially 
inflated electoral rolls that drive down the turnout rate. We address this issue by examining the components of 
the turnout ratio and find that the number of persons registered to vote was inflated in all districts in the early 
90s, more so than theoretically possible, judging from statistics on the segment of the population that is 
eligible to register. Our simple analyses show two important ideas. First, the revision of electoral registration 
policy in the late 90s making updates mandatory deflated the denominator of the turnout rate in the 1999 
election year—thus supporting our suspicions of methodological artificiality in the turnout rate.  Second, we 
show that the rolls continue inflated in 2002, thus casting doubt on official statistics on voter turnout in 
Portugal. 
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Voting is the keystone political activity in contemporary democracies.  It constitutes 
the method by which all adult citizens can express an equal voice on the conduct of public 
affairs.  To the extent a nation’s citizens ignore a request to speak or purposefully turn their 
backs on such a request, there are doubts and questions as to the value of democracy to that 
citizenry.  Just such doubts and questions have crept into the minds of observers of Portugal 
after one generation of experience with democracia.  In the elections just after the 
Revolution, voter participation stood at undeniably healthy levels, in the mid-80 percent 
range.  Twenty to 25 years later, however, voter participation had dropped into the mid-60 
percent range, which marks a level that puts the involvement of Portuguese voters behind 
nearly all other European countries.   
The low and declining level of Portuguese turnout is worrisome in its own right, in 
relation to what it might tell us about the Portuguese people’s excitement about and 
commitment to democratic procedures, but it takes on direct and particular consequences 
when it determines the outcome of public issues.  Just such as effect was felt when more 
than two out of three registered voters failed to cast a ballot in the first-ever national 
referendum.  The 1998 abortion referendum had a 32% turnout among registered citizens, 
with the consequence of negating any legal force their own voices could have had because 
the constitutionally required threshold of 50% turnout had not been achieved.   
What is one to make of this seeming indifference to public involvement in Portugal?  
There are potentially manifold answers, but any and all depend on the basic facts being 
observed.  Our purpose is to ask whether the turnout levels we have been observing in 
Portugal are themselves mere artifacts of the governmental accounting methods than facts 
of the people’s inclination to get involved in public life.  We suspect that the decline could 
  
lie with artificially inflated electoral rolls. We investigate this suspicion by examining the 
components of the turnout ratio. We find that the number of persons registered to vote was 
inflated beyond what is logically possible in all districts in the early 90s. Furthermore, we 
find that the reassessment of the registration rolls in 1999 did not fully solve the inflation 
problem.  In the process we also find incontrovertible evidence that there has been some 
degree of turnout decline, but that decline would probably be of approximately the same 
modest proportion that is evident in other European nations in recent years.  The lion share 
of Portugal’s seemingly large decline and relatively low levels of turnout is attributable in 
very large part to how the government records the number of registered voters. 
 
Voter Turnout 
Stein Rokkan asserted that the act of voting is a “unique form of political 
participation” (Perea, 2002: 644).  First of all, since the adoption of universal suffrage, 
voting is the most widespread form of participation.  Very often, it is the only way citizens 
have to participate on a regular basis.  Secondly, the secret ballot ensures that citizens can 
participate with absolute freedom since they are not accountable to anyone for their 
political options.  Lastly, voting means equal influence in participation.  The idea of “one 
person one vote” is widely seen as the cornerstone for the ideal of democracy.   
If, on the one hand, the act of voting is widely held to be an “indispensable” and 
unique form of political participation (Perea, 2002: 645), on the other hand, the literature on 
voter turnout has not provided a unique interpretation of it.  What is the real meaning of an 
abstention percentage figure? The answer is not as easy as it seems.  According to the most 
widely held view, a high turnout rate indicates satisfaction with the political system in the 
  
same way as abstention indicates apathy and alienation of the citizens.  On the other hand,  
a low turnout rate may indicate the electorate´s basic satisfaction with the political system 
and its functioning and that a high turnout rate indicates a decline in consensus that may 
turn out to produce instability.  
But the need to understand the meaning of turnout rate is acute because we observe a 
lot of variation either across countries or over time.  Across countries the differences are 
large enough for one to wonder.  Table 1 shows voter turnout percentages in Western 
Europe from 1975-1997. From this table, we can see that turnout in Switzerland averages 
between 40% and 50% while in Belgium they average over 90%.  The literature on voting 
behavior has tried to understand and explain these variations.  Two general theses have 
been pressed into service to explain variation in turnout, one cultural values and another 
emphasizes institutional arrangements (Almond and Verba 1963; Verba 1965; Inglehart 
1990; Putnam 1993; Powell 1986; Jackman 1987). The cultural argument would lead us to 
anticipate distinctly lower rates of participation in the new democracies than we would 
expect from the institutional perspective.  On the other hand, some scholars argue that 
variations in turnout rates across industrial democracies during the 1960s and 1970s are 
largely a result of institutional arrangements and electoral laws. According to this view, the 
levels of voter turnout are not so much a result of cultural norms, but rather that of 
institutional and electoral procedures, such as nationally competitive elections; electoral 
proportionality; number of parties; mandatory voting laws (Jackman and Miller 1995). 
 
  
Table 1 Voter Turnout Percentages in Western Europe, 1975-1997 
 
 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-97 
Austria 92.5 92.6 90.4 84.1 82.7 
Belgium 94.9 94.6 93.4 92.7 91.1 
Denmark 87.2 85.8 86.3 83.6 -- 
Finland 74.5 75.7 72.1 72.1 68.5 
France 83.3 70.9 72.3 68.9 68 
Germany 90.8 88.5 84.3 78.4 -- 
Greece 81.1 78.6 82.4 82.5 78.7 
Iceland 89.8 88.6 90.1 87.6 87.0 
Ireland 76.3 74.2 70.9 68.5 65.9 
Italy 92.2 89.0 90.5 86.7 82.9 
Luxembourg 88.9 88.8 87.4 88.3 -- 
Netherlands 88.0 84.0 82.9 78.3 -- 
Norway 82.9 82.0 83.3 75.8 78.0 
Portugal 86.6 81.1 72.4 68.2 66.7 
Spain 68.1 79.8 70.2 77.3 78.1 
Sweden 91.2 91.4 87.9 86.7 -- 
Switzerland 50.2 48.9 46.8 46.0 42.3 
U. K.  76.3 72.8 75.4 77.8 71.3 
Source: Lane and Ersson 1999: 141. 
 
In addition to variation in turnout rates across countries, Table 1 also seems to 
suggest important variation in the trend in turnout rates over time. Overall, the trend of 
voter turnout is downward.  The average rate of participation for all countries included fell 
below a score of 80% for the first time in the 1980s continuing in the 1990s (Lane and 
Ersson, 1999; Mackie and Rose, 1991).  
The trend seems to be even clearer in the new democracies in Southern Europe (Lane 
and Ersson, 1999). In particular, Portugal, with the exception of Ireland and Switzerland, 
appears to be the country with the lowest level of turnout since the second half of the 
1980s. Are Portuguese citizens failing to understand the uniqueness of voting for the ideal 
of democracy?  That is the question that comes to mind, if the facts tell us that the decline is 
somehow embedded in Portugal’s culture.  But, as McDonald and Popkin (2001) ask: Are 
Portuguese voters really vanishing or are these numbers a myth?  That is, the principal 
  
explanation for the decline may reside with institutional arrangement, in particular the way 
in which the electoral registries are maintained. 
 
A Look at the Portuguese Evidence on Voter Turnout 
In Portugal turnout rates have declined since 1975.  In fact, the Portuguese have 
been identified to be among the Europeans that least turn out to vote. The number of voters 
has dwindled throughout its 20 districts since the first free election in 1975. In the 1999 
legislative election, Portugal had the recorded lowest turnout in legislative elections—61%. 
However, the statistics we are often presented with may not be accurate.  We suspect they 
may be the result of the way turnout figures are calculated, possibly leading to a lower 
turnout result, and consequently to a misleading methodological artifact.   
A look into the raw turnout percentages is worth considering.  The ratio calculation 
conceals a phenomenon that may be at the root of the decreasing voter turnout, more so 
than voting behavior itself.  Throughout a quarter of a century of democratic rule, voter 
turnout in legislative elections has gone from a figure in the vicinity of 90% to 
approximately 60%, and even lower in many Portuguese districts.  An examination of 
Figure 1 and Table 2 clearly shows that the turnout rate did indeed decline steadily in every 
district.  For example, consider the turnout rates in Lisboa, Porto, and Braga—the three 
largest districts. Turnout rates in these districts were respectively: 91.9%, 93.8%, and 
93.0% in 1975; 77.6%, 78.7%, and 78.8% in 1985; 67.1%, 71.0%, and 71.1% in 1995, and 
more recently in 2002, 63.3%, 65.7%, and 67.4%.  
 
 
  
 
Table 2 Voter Turnout Rates in the Legislative Elections in the Portuguese Districts, 1975-1999 
 
Districts 1975 1976 1979 1980 1983 1985 1987 1991 1995 1999 2002
Aveiro .92 .85 .88 .86 .79 .76 .74 .70 .69 .63 .63 
Beja .92 .84 .87 .84 .78 .74 .68 .64 .64 .59 .58 
Braga .93 .88 .91 .89 .82 .79 .76 .72 .71 .67 .67 
Bragança .91 .79 .84 .80 .70 .65 .65 .61 .59 .55 .56 
Castelo Branco .91 .81 .86 .84 .76 .74 .71 .68 .67 .64 .63 
Coimbra .89 .78 .84 .82 .75 .71 .70 .67 .66 .62 .62 
Évora .94 .88 .91 .89 .84 .81 .75 .70 .69 .62 .62 
Faro   .91 .81 .85 .83 .77 .74 .70 .66 .64 .58 .58 
Guarda .92 .82 .88 .84 .74 .71 .70 .65 .60 .60 .58 
Leiria .89 .80 .86 .84 .77 .73 .72 .67 .66 .62 .63 
Lisboa .92 .83 .88 .86 .81 .78 .74 .68 .67 .62 .63 
Portalegre .94 .87 .89 .88 .82 .80 .75 .71 .70 .64 .62 
Porto .94 .88 .91 .89 .82 .79 .78 .72 .71 .65 .66 
Santarém .92 .82 .86 .85 .78 .76 .73 .69 .68 .62 .63 
Setúbal .93 .85 .88 .87 .82 .80 .73 .68 .68 .61 .61 
Viana do Castelo .89 .79 .84 .82 .75 .72 .71 .65 .64 .61 .61 
Vila Real .89 .78 .84 .81 .72 .67 .67 .62 .60 .57 .58 
Viseu .89 .78 .85 .82 .74 .69 .69 .63 .61 .59 .59 
Açores .90 .78 .83 .76 .67 .60 .54 .58 .57 .50 .48 
Madeira .89 .78 .85 .81 .73 .70 .67 .65 .65 .58 .59 
Average 
 
.91 .82 .87 .84 .77 .73 .71 .67 .65 .61 .62 
Sources: Comissão Nacional de Eleições. 
 
 
 
  
Figure 1 Voter Turnout Rates in Legislative Elections by District, 1975-2002 
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Voter turnout is, of course, a ratio; the numerator is the number of voters and the 
denominator is the number of those eligible to vote.  It follows then that the turnout rate can 
decline in three ways.  One way is as a result of a decrease in the number of voters; another  
is through an increase in the number of persons eligible to vote; a third way is through a 
combination of both.  Because of this, one must examine what happened to the individual 
components of the turnout ratio. As we can see from Figure 2, the number of actual voters 
  
has held fairly steady in the vicinity between 5 and 6 million ballots cast, although there 
have been slight declines between 1980 and 1990 and between 1995 and 2002.  Population, 
too, has held fairly steady, in the vicinity of 10 million persons.  What has changed most 
noticeably over these 25 years is the growth in the number of persons registered to vote.  
Between 1975 and 1995, the number of registered voters grew by more than 2 million.  
This expansion could go a long way toward explaining the persistent decline.  
 
Figure 2 Comparison of the Count of the Population, Persons Registered, and Voters, 1975-99 
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To check this, let us take, for example, the 1991 population, registration, and election results 
(see Table 3). A quick look at Table 3 clearly reveals that something is suspect about the 
electoral rolls. The difference between the 1991 Census estimates of the population 
(Column A and Column B) gives us an estimate of the number of persons old enough to be 
eligible to register registered to vote (Column C). A comparison of Columns C and D 
  
reveals that the number of individuals who are theoretically eligible to register is noticeably 
smaller than the number of persons actually registered to vote. This means the electoral 
rolls must be inflated. Age 18 is the minimum for registration in Portugal, therefore it 
would be preferable to have data on the segment of the population aged 18 and younger. 1 
Critics could argue that Column B does not provide us with an accurate estimate of 
the population eligible to register. However, available statistical data for this year does not 
provide us with the number of individuals aged 18 and older (or alternatively 17 and 
younger). However, this should not prove damaging to the argument we are making 
concerning the difference between what the electoral rolls suggest should be the population 
underage to register and the actual number of those ineligible to register given such a large 
difference.  In other words, the number of individuals aged 18 and 19 should not affect this 
difference score by very much.  We were able to find estimates on the number of 
individuals aged 18 and 19 for 1998, seven years later; these data reassure us that this group 
aged 18-19 is a small fraction of 1991 segment of the population aged 19 and younger 
(Column B), meaning that in 1991 the number of individuals aged 18 and 19 should be 
slightly smaller than these presented here for 1998. For instance, individuals aged 18-19 in 
Lisboa added up to 54 670 in 1998. This is 10% of the segment of the population aged 19 
and younger reported in Column B, 530 589; therefore, the group of individuals aged 18-19 
cannot justify the large inflation figures in Column E. 
In Column G of Table 5, we calculated the inflation rate in the electoral rolls. We 
show that in 1991, the rolls were inflated in every district, ranging from approximately 12% 
in Porto and also in Aveiro to a maximum of 64% in Braga. In sum, we show that the 
  
denominator of the turnout rate is clearly inflated, casting doubt on the decline of the voter 
turnout rate in Portugal. 
 
Table 3 Illustration of Inflation of Electoral Rolls in the 1991 Legislative Election Year, by 
District  
 
 
Districts 
A 
1991   
Population 
Count 
B 
1991 
 Pop 
Aged 19 or < 
C 
(A-B) 
Persons 
Theoretically 
Eligible to 
Register 
D 
1991 
Registration 
Count 
E 
(D-C) 
Inflation  
Count 
Electoral 
Rolls  
F 
(E/C) 
Percentage 
Inflation in 
1991 
Aveiro 667314 197300 470014 526727 56713 12.07 
Beja 165261 41234 124027 152597 28570 23.04 
Braga 776254 260771 515483 587337 71854 64.08 
Bragança 155423 43290 112133 148876 36743 32.77 
Castelo Branco 209948 50824 159124 199654 40530 25.47 
Coimbra 425211 107450 317761 370925 53164 16.73 
Évora 171143 42812 128331 149495 21164 16.49 
Faro 339836 86730 253106 293573 40467 15.99 
Guarda 184337 47967 136370 173630 37260 27.32 
Leiria 427633 112954 314679 358145 43466 13.81 
Lisboa 2057562 530589 1526973 1796885 269912 17.68 
Portalegre 130706 30145 100561 117052 16491 16.40 
Porto 1686884 506438 1180446 1319056 138610 11.74 
Santarém 440006 112019 327987 385602 57615 17.57 
Setúbal 719347 198303 521044 595534 74490 14.30 
V. do Castelo 242371 72937 169434 214800 45366 26.78 
Vila Real 236594 720929 164495 213334 48839 29.69 
Viseu 402273 122964 379309 344478 65169 17.18 
Açores 239190 84260 154930 181018 26088 16.84 
Madeira 250550 86887 163663 193763 30100 18.39 
Sources: 1991 Census; Comissão Nacional de Eleições. 
 
 
 
Methodological Artificiality in the Denominator of the Turnout Rate  
As we can see, there were more persons registered to vote in 1991 than the number 
of the individuals who were actually eligible to register. How this could be brings us to the 
point of our argument. It is not theoretically logical for the number of registered persons to 
grow at the same rate as the actual growth in the population—much less at a higher rate. 
  
But judging from the figures, that is what appears to have happened. The population at 
large grew at a rate of .1 from 1976 to 2002 across all districts, while the number of persons 
eligible to vote, i.e. the number of registered persons, grew at more than three times that 
rate, .34 see Figure 2 for an illustration).  
One reason for this inconsistent phenomenon is that the electoral rolls may be 
inflated with names of deceased persons.  Another reason may be perhaps that the names of 
those who have moved from one municipality to another have been kept consistently on the 
rolls in the previous residential municipality(ies) so that some potential voter may be 
registered in two or more locales. Either situation is possible given that there has been little 
control on matters of electoral registration by the competent authorities in the past, at least 
up until 1999. 
According to Portuguese constitutional and electoral law, the apportionment of seats 
per district is based on the number of registered voters in the district (Article 149º), after 
allowance for four seats elected by Portuguese citizens living abroad, thus providing 
municipalities with a theoretical incentive for leaving names from the rolls and thus 
restricting turnout figures.  Let us consider the fact that in 1998 the government proceeded 
for the first time ever to update the electoral rolls. This resulted in the legislative act, Lei nº 
13/99, which establishes the new legal regime for electoral registration. This act noted the 
changes in boldface type. Among the most interesting of these changes, for our purposes, 
are articles 47º through 49º. These state that a change in residency from one administrative 
jurisdiction of registration to another implies a transfer of the elector´s name and the 
elimination his/her name by registration committees from the prior roll. The mere fact that 
this constitutes a novelty is already supportive of the idea of inflated electoral rolls. Among 
  
other reasons for the elimination of names from the electoral rolls is the death (Article 49º, 
c). 
As a result of this governmental initiative, one would expect to see the number of 
persons registered in each district to decline in the election years following the Lei 13/99, 
thus making for more credible voter turnout rate statistics.   For comparative purposes, 
Table 4 shows the voter turnout rate and its components by district for three different 
legislative election years—l995-2002—one before the correction of the electoral rolls and 
the two following the update. As it appears from this simple analysis, the Portuguese 
turnout figures were indeed methodologically flawed due to inflated electoral rolls. 
Generally speaking, from the 1995 to the 1999 election years, the number of names on the  
electoral rolls did diminish—3% across all districts. There is evidence of some decline in 
the number of votes cast (see Figure 3a), more so than the decline in the number of persons 
registered to vote—10% across all districts. From the 1999 to the 2002 election years, the 
effects of the 1999 correction in the electoral rolls are less notorious, as would be expected. 
Table 4 and Figure 3b show that the number voters increased in most districts, but so did 
the number of registered persons—in all but seven districts.  
 
 
 
Table 4  Number of Persons Registered, Number of Voters, and Voter Turnout Rates in the 
1995-2002 Legislative Elections, by District 
 
  Number of 
Persons 
Registered 
  Number 
of Voters 
  Voter 
Turnout
Rates 
 
Districts 1995 1999 2002 1995 1999 2002 1995 1999 2002 
Aveiro 539057 571455 580904 383676 362371 368602   .69 .63 .63 
Beja 151016 144921 141549 96468 85024 82283 .64 .59 .58 
  
Braga 640514 654287 672317 452981 441438 453252 .71 .67 .67 
Bragança 154459 150247 150599 90603 82132 84753 .59 .55 .56 
C. Branco 202995 192358 190863 136839 122622 119712 .67 .64 .63 
Coimbra 380227 378701 378195 254800 233244 234266 .66 .62 .62 
Évora 151035 148820 147164 104500 92586 91022 .69 .62 .62 
Faro 309018 313469 318058 198360 180216 185766 .64 .58 .58 
Guarda 176818 170987 171041 113406 101970 100842 .60 .60 .58 
Leiria 374257 374867 380261 244528 231945 238954 .66 .62 .63 
Lisboa 1876610 1825612 1801824 1262256 1127653 1140175 .67 .62 .63 
Portalegre 115402 112297 110329 82248 71258 68463 .70 .64 .62 
Porto 1405730 1411557 1426551 1001151 917419 937312 .71 .65 .66 
Santarém 396918 389692 387807 269461 242495 242758 .68 .62 .63 
Setúbal 636420 645045 651159 432955 389948 394386 .68 .61 .61 
V. Castelo 225309 225658 229815 145052 137179 139237 .64 .61 .61 
Vila Real 224022 219118 221291 133170 124375 127620 .60 .57 .58 
Viseu 357660 348083 355074 217194 203673 209424 .61 .59 .59 
Açores 188327 186578 188832 106258 93763 89808 .57 .50 .48 
Madeira 206959 208567 213316 132766 121583 125289 .65 .58 .59 
Total/Aver. 
 
8906608 8672319 8716949 5904854 5362894 5433924 .65 .61 .62 
Sources: Comissão Nacional de Eleições. 
 
Figure 3a: Change in the Number of Voters and Persons Registered between the 1999 and 
1995 Legislative Elections 
Voters 
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Figure 3b: Change in the Number of Voters and Persons Registered between the 2002 and 
1999 Legislative Elections 
 
Voters 
                                               +
Coimbra             Lisboa         Santarém    
 
 Aveiro        Braga        Bragança      Faro    
Leiria         Porto        Setúbal        V. Castelo     
Vila Real      Viseu    Madeira           
                                            +    
 Beja        C. Branco      
 Évora         Portalegre  
 
                                                   -
                                       Persons Registered
Guarda      Açores  
 
The decline in the number of persons registered was not as notorious as would be 
expected given our analysis of Table 3. This led us to wonder just how successful the 
correction in the electoral rolls was. Table 5 shows the number of persons eligible to 
register in 2001 and the actual number of persons registered in 2002 (already shown above 
in Table 4). It essentially replicates Table 3 except that now we want to check the extent to 
which electoral rolls were corrected. The ideal result would be to see the percentage of 
inflation reduce to zero or negative numbers (negative numbers simply imply that not all 
citizens who are eligible to register have done so). As we can see, though, this is not what 
happened. It is true that the percentage of inflation has decreased substantially in most 
districts, with the exceptions of Bragança, Vila Real, and Madeira—as the comparison of 
columns G and H show—however, the registration numbers still exceed what the census 
counts tell us is the maximum possible.  The correction did not do the whole trick.  
Something is still wrong with the registration numbers.  The rolls continue inflated, three 
years after the electoral registration policy revision.  
  
 
Table 5: Illustration of Inflation of Electoral Rolls in the 2002 Legislative Election Year, by 
District 
 
 
 
Districts  
A 
2001   
Population 
Count 
B 
2001 
Pop Aged 18+ 
 (Persons 
Theoretically 
Eligible to 
Register) 
C 
2002 
Registration 
Count 
F 
(C-B) 
Inflation  
Count 
Electoral 
Rolls  
G 
(F/D) 
Percentage  
Inflation in 
2002 
H 
Percentage  
Inflation in 
1991 
Aveiro 714791 565487 580904 15417 2.73 12.07 
Beja 158436 131592 141549 9957 7.57 23.04 
Braga 826267 635928 672317 36389 5.72 64.08 
Bragança 146322 122068 150599 28531 23.37 32.77 
Castelo Branco 208120 174474 190863 16389 9.39 25.47 
Coimbra 443311 365681 378195 12514 3.42 16.73 
Évora 171012 141699 147164 5465 3.86 16.49 
Faro 399236 327741 318058 -9683 -2.95 15.99 
Guarda 179796 149669 171041 21372 14.28 27.32 
Leiria 462266 376032 380261 4229 1.12 13.81 
Lisboa 2141578 1745385 1801824 56439 3.23 17.68 
Portalegre 124690 104201 110329 6128 5.88 16.40 
Porto 1771043 1388712 1426551 37839 2.72 11.74 
Santarém 453990 379402 387807 8405 2.22 17.57 
Setúbal 791769 645673 651159 5486 0.85 14.30 
V. do Castelo 247052 200563 229815 29252 14.58 26.78 
Vila Real 220405 179040 221291 42251 23.60 29.69 
Viseu 394170 316910 355074 38164 12.04 17.18 
Açores 237315 174026 188832 14806 8.51 16.84 
Madeira 243988 185063 213316 28253 15.27 18.39 
Sources: 1991 Census; Comissão Nacional de Eleições. 
 
Conclusion 
Declining voter turnout has been a concern in the literature on political behavior for 
time now.  Competing theories explain the determinants of voter turnout in an attempt to 
address the downward trend. Statistics would have us believe the Portuguese citizenry is 
not very interested in politics, as voter turnout data reveal that the Portuguese have steadily 
been going less often to the polls.  Perhaps the voters are not turning out as much anymore; 
  
perhaps not. Can we trust these statistics? What if the problem lies not with electorate 
behavior but rather with the measurement of the components of the turnout rate?  
This paper investigates the extent to which the voter turnout figure is reliable. We 
argue here that it could be methodologically flawed as a result of inflation of electoral 
registration. The answer to these questions becomes extremely important in a young 
democracy where suspicions of political apathy have come to the forefront and whose 
Constitution requires a turnout threshold for referenda voting, such as Portugal. An 
erroneous measurement of the turnout rate could change the course of policy issues that are 
brought to referenda and could have already skewed the results of the two referenda already 
held in Portugal. 
We took our suspicions to the test by examining the evolution of the separate 
components of the turnout ratio for the particular election year, for which we have 
demographic census data available. We found that the decline in voter turnout rates was to 
a substantial degree the result of a faulty measurement of the denominator of the ratio—the 
number of persons eligible to vote. This is because the population that was registered to 
vote was greater than that portion of the population eligible to register in all districts in 
1991, ranging from approximately 12% in Porto and Aveiro to a maximum of 64% in 
Braga.  
A look at official 1999 voter turnout rate in its separate parts following the update in 
the electoral rolls, reveals that the number of electors on the rolls dropped in most districts, 
thus supporting the artificiality argument. Because electoral registration policy in Portugal 
underwent substantial revision in 1999 prior to the legislative election that same year and 
after the first nationwide referendum results on abortion having failed to meet the threshold, 
  
we again looked for inflation in the 2002 legislative year using 2001 census data and found 
that the rolls continue to be inflated, although to a much lesser extent than we found in 
1991.  
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1 The Constitution states that electoral registration is compulsory, but in practice that is not what occurs. It is 
up to each individual to take the necessary steps to register electoral registration regime. Registration is 
voluntary for national residents (Article 1º and 4º, line a of Lei 13/99). 
